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Abstract 
 
Withdrawal from the EU is no more a taboo subject. However, the process by which 
it can happen is unclear and potentially complex. The purpose of this paper is to 
show that a withdrawing Member State will not only rid itself from the constraints 
and obligations of EU rules, but it will also have to re-invent many policies and 
institutions to fill the gap left by the non-application of EU rules. 
 
The paper examines closely the case of the UK and Scotland and concludes that 
outright exit is not the best option for a withdrawing Member State. The best, but 
possibly the least feasible, option is an intermediate arrangement falling between full 
membership and complete separation from the EU. The exact position between the 
two extremes can only be determined by the exit negotiations and will be influenced 
by the political climate that will prevail at that time. 
 
While the final destination of an acceding country is well known [full adoption of the 
obligations of EU membership], the exiting country will be embarking on a trip with 
unknown destination and full of surprises. 
 
JEL-codes: F15, O52, P48 
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 “the voyage is a long one, 
full of adventure, full of discovery” 
C. Kavafy, Ithaca 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, Member 
States of the European Union have formally acquired right to leave the Union. Until 
2009, the EU had a provision on entry of new Members but not on exit of existing 
Member States. Not having a withdrawal clause is not unusual but it is not the norm 
either.1 Other treaties such as those that establish NATO and the WTO have clauses 
on voluntary withdrawal (as did the WEU under Article XII of the Modified Brussels 
Treaty, which also contained provisions on disbanding of the WEU itself). 
 
Whether Member States were free or not to withdraw before 2009 is a matter of 
contention. It would have been very difficult for the EU and the Member States to 
stop another Member State from leaving the Union if there were overwhelming 
popular support in the latter in favour of leaving the Union. After all, legitimacy 
stems from the will of the people and the Union prides itself for being based on 
democratic principles [Articles 2 & 6 TEU]. 
 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, 1969, 
withdrawal has in principle to be provided explicitly in the first place. Moreover, 
withdrawal has to take place in line with the relevant rules [Article 54]. 
 
However, the Vienna Convention also provides that a contracting party may 
withdraw from a treaty which does not have a withdrawal clause when all parties to 
the treaty agree. Normally, a three-month notice is required. In addition, the 
Convention does recognize the possibility that a contracting party may withdraw 
unilaterally from a treaty that has no exit clause due to a “fundamental change in 
circumstances” which “constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to 
be bound by the treaty” [Article 62]. States may withdraw without the agreement of 
the other parties to a treaty if the parties intended to allow the possibility of 
denouncing the treaty or withdrawing from it, or if “a right of denunciation or 
withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.” [Article 56] When a state 
                                               
1 See Jan Klabbers, Åsa Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of 
International Organizations, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011). 
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withdraws in this context it must give at least 12 months of notice. Again, the WEU, 
Article XII is a good example. 
 
It appears then that if an EU Member State wanted to withdraw before 2009, it 
would have found suitable justification. The question is why the withdrawal clause 
was inserted into the Treaty on the European Union. Indeed the explanatory notes 
in the files of the Convention that prepared the constitutional treaty that was the 
precursor to the Treaty of Lisbon indicate that there was the view that the right of 
withdrawal could be exercised even in the absence of an explicit provision to that 
effect. The EU was an organization of “freely cooperating nations” and based on 
“consent”. 
 
It was also thought that the withdrawal of a Member State from the Union could not 
be made conditional upon the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement. This 
apparently is the reason that, according to Article 50 TEU, withdrawal can take effect 
in any event two years after notification. Otherwise the withdrawing Member State 
could be held in negotiations indefinitely by opposing Member States. The possibility 
for extending the period by mutual consent was intended to encourage the drafting 
of a withdrawal agreement that could establish a new form of relationship between 
the EU and the withdrawing Member State and regulate their bilateral affairs after 
exit. 
 
It is one thing to provide for the possibility of exit and a totally different thing to put 
it into practice. The purpose of this paper is to consider the complexity and 
consequences of organized exit from the EU. It argues that it is both conceptually 
difficult and unpredictable – a leap in the dark. It sketches the complexity of 
withdrawal by juxtaposing the process and goals of entry into the EU with the 
possible process and aims of exit. In addition to coping with the economic effects of 
exit, the paper also explains that leaving the EU is likely to create a legal lacuna in 
the withdrawing Member State. Although Article 50 refers to non-application of EU 
law [the “Treaties shall cease to apply”], withdrawal will in all probability require 
extensive re-legislation and the building of new institutions and procedures on 
policy-making and policy enforcement. 
 
Exit will be very much like the voyage described in Cavafy’s poem, Ithaca. It will be 
full of adventure and discovery. However, it is unlikely to be long or smooth. 
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2. The relevant Treaty provisions 
 
The procedures for acceding and withdrawing to the European Union are defined in 
Article 49 and 50, respectively, of the Treaty on the European Union, as revised by 
the Treaty of Lisbon.2 
 
Article 49 (the “entry” clause) 
“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The 
European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. 
The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the 
European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The 
conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into 
account. 
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union 
is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement 
between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be 
submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements.” 
 
Article 50 (the “exit” clause) 
“1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union 
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the 
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with 
Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be 
concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement 
with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 
                                               
2 See consolidated version in OJ C 326, 26 October 2012. 
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4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or 
of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in 
the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A 
qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.  
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be 
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.” 
 
 
3. Entry procedure 
 
Although there is no secondary legislation laying down specific rules to govern the 
process of accession to the EU, after seven rounds of enlargement, a well-
established practice is in place. This practice is significantly more complicated than 
what Article 49 TEU suggests. It can be divided into 10 separate stages of varying 
length and complexity and which can be summarised as follows:3 
1. Submission of application in the form of a letter addressed to the Presidency of 
the Council. The applicant country has to be European and democratic. 
2. The Council considers the merits of the application and then instructs the 
Commission to issue an opinion or “avis”. 
3. The Commission services may take several months or even years to prepare the 
avis. Commission officials carry out many visits to the applicant country and 
scrutinise its laws and policies. The Commission’s assessment is based on 
principles defined by the  European Council and especially the Copenhagen 
European Council of 1992. All avis have the same structure. They examine the 
suitability of the applicant and its capacity to assume the obligations of 
membership, they identify particular problems and necessary reforms that have 
to be undertaken by the candidate before entry into the EU and they consider 
the impact on the EU and how the EU may adjust to increased membership. For 
example, the Commission may recommend an increase in structural funds to 
accommodate the needs of new members who may be poorer than existing 
members. 
                                               
3 For a detailed analysis see Phedon Nicolaides et al, A Guide to the Enlargement of the European 
Union (II): A Review of the Process, Negotiations, Policy Reforms and Enforcement Capacity, 
(Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1999) and Phedon Nicolaides and Sylvia Raja 
Boean, Guide to the Enlargement of the European Union: Determinants, Process, Timing, 
Negotiations, (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1997). 
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4. The Commission submits its avis to the Council with a recommendation to open 
or not accession negotiations. There have been occasions where the Commission 
did not recommend immediate launch of accession negotiations [e.g. Greece 
1979, Cyprus and Malta 1993]. 
5. The Council approves unanimously the avis of the Commission and instructs the 
Commission to initiate the process of negotiations. The applicant country is 
elevated to the status of a “candidate”. 
6. Candidates become eligible to receive pre-accession financial assistance to adjust 
their economies and prepare for accession to the EU. 
7. When the accession negotiations begin they are divided into two stages. The 
screening stage and the negotiation stage proper. During the screening stage, 
the Commission presents detailed reviews and explanations of the acquis. The 
aquis, EU practice and issues concerning institutional matters are divided into 
negotiating chapters. Currently there are 36 such chapters. The last chapter 
covers institutional matters which concern, for example, the number of votes that 
the candidate may have in the Council or the number of MEPs. The negotiation 
stage is also divided into two sub-stages. In the first sub-stage, the candidate 
presents its laws and policies to the Commission and explains what needs to be 
done to ensure compliance with the requirements of primary and secondary EU 
law. On the basis of these presentations, the Commission prepares reports 
assessing the degree of compliance of the candidate country and submits these 
reports to the Council. The Member States in the Council then hold meetings with 
the candidate. These are the formal negotiating sessions but in reality hardly any 
negotiating takes place. Article 49 gives the impression that the Council and the 
candidate, as equal partners, consider how the acquis may be changed to 
accommodate the candidate. This cannot be further from reality. The candidate 
is expected to accept the whole acquis as it stands. At most, the candidate may 
request some temporary exceptions or “derogations” where adjustment to the 
acquis is too costly or takes time. Once agreement is reached, negotiating 
chapters are closed. Most hard negotiations are left for last and they concern 
money – how much the candidate will receive from the structural funds and the 
common agricultural policy. During these stages, the Commission also prepares 
annual progress reports. 
8. After the conclusion of the negotiations, the Commission submits to the Council a 
second avis with a recommendation for approval of the agreed terms of entry. 
9. The Council decides unanimously, after the European Parliament gives its 
consent and then the Treaty of Accession is drafted. 
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10. After the Treaty of Accession is signed, it is submitted for ratification to the 
parliaments of the Member States and the candidate country, according to their 
constitutions [some countries also require popular referendums]. The Treaty of 
Accession also makes the necessary adjustment to the existing EU Treaties.  
 
 
It is obvious that entry into the EU is complex. It touches on almost everything that 
a country does and affects directly or indirectly almost all its laws and policies. It can 
also be lengthy. For example, Cyprus and Malta applied in July 1990 and finally 
admitted into the EU in May 2004. By contrast, Finland applied in 1992 and entered 
in 1995. 
 
4. Exit procedure 
 
With the exception of Greenland in 1985, the EU has no experience in managing the 
exit of a Member State. The case of Greenland offers no guidance because of its 
dependence on Denmark and its almost exclusive reliance on fish. Nothing of 
substance had to be changed in the Treaties when Greenland left. Moreover, hardly 
anything had to put in place to govern the post-exit relations of Greenland with the 
EU because Greenland interests are still represented via Denmark and Greenland’s 
major concern was to exercise exclusive rights over fisheries. Everything else did not 
matter much. 
 
Article 50 TEU appears to define the following stages of a negotiated and 
presumably amicable withdrawal: 
1. The withdrawing Member State notifies the European Council [instead of the 
Council]. 
2. The European Council issues guidelines on the basis of which the Council 
negotiates the terms of exit and future relationship between the EU and that 
Member State. 
3. The negotiations are conducted by the EU according to recommendations by the 
Commission and the Council decides by a qualified majority after receiving the 
consent of the European Parliament. 
 
Article 50 TEU adds three important qualifications. First, if no agreement is reached 
within two years, the Treaties “cease to apply” to the withdrawing Member State 
unless the European Council and that Member State unanimously decide to extend 
the period. 
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Second, the withdrawing Member State does not participate in the decisions of the 
European Council or Council that concern it. That is, the Council  acts by qualified 
majority of the remaining Member States. 
 
Third, if that Member State wishes at a future point to rejoin the EU, it will have to 
follow the entry procedure in Article 49 TEU. 
There is little academic literature on Article 50 TEU. This is not surprising because 
until the UK voiced its intention to re-negotiate the terms of its membership, the 
withdrawal provision was considered to be no more than a theoretical option. Most 
of the existing literature is also speculative.4 
 
 
5. Differences between entry and exit 
 
It appears that Article 50 defines a fairly simple procedure in comparison to the 
procedure laid down in Article 49. For example, there is no requirement for 
ratification. But this appearance is misleading for the following reasons. 
 
First, the political climate is likely to be very different. The negotiations will not be 
conducted in the usual mood of optimism that has prevailed in most enlargements. 
There will be bitterness on both sides. 
 
Second, after seven enlargements there is a fairly established practice concerning 
accession to the EU, despite the absence of secondary legislation. Because of 
complete absence of experience with withdrawal, it is more likely that the procedure 
will be disputed by both sides. This almost certainly will add to the acrimony 
surrounding the decision of a Member State to leave the Union. 
 
Third, acceding countries have much less negotiating power than the EU. After all, 
they are the ones knocking on the door of the EU. A withdrawing country is likely to 
have less interest in satisfying EU demands. Negotiating power depends both on 
what you can offer and on what the other side wants. A country that wants little has 
                                               
4 See Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, 
European Central Bank, Legal Working Papers Series, no. 10, December 2009; Jochen Herbst, 
Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the “Masters of the 
Treaties”? German Law Journal, 2005, vol. 6(11), pp. 1755-1760; Hannes Hofmeister  ‘Should I Stay 
or Should I Go ?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to  Withdraw from the EU, European Law Journal, 
2010, vol. 16(5), pp. 589–603; Adam Łazowski, How to withdraw from the European Union? 
Confronting hard reality, CEPS, 16 January 2013; Adam Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European 
Union and Alternatives to Membership, European Law Review, 2012, vol. 37(5), pp.523-540. 
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a lot of negotiating power, ceteris paribus, simply because it can afford to walk away 
from the negotiating table. Therefore, a country that initiates the procedure for 
withdrawal must have concluded that it becomes better off outside the EU and does 
not need the EU. Then the EU will not be able to exert much influence. The only 
bargaining chip that the EU will have at its disposal will concern the post-exit 
relationship that the withdrawing Member State would want to establish with the EU. 
 
Fourth, the negotiating power of the withdrawing country is likely to be even 
stronger by the fact that if there is no agreement within two years, EU Treaties 
automatically cease to apply to that country. A withdrawing country will eventually 
get at least the second-best of what it wants [assuming that the first-best is a 
convenient post-exit relationship]. By contrast, the accession process has no binding 
deadlines. The EU can delay the entry of a candidate country until it secures the 
concessions or the compliance it wants. But it cannot delay the exit of a country 
which does not respond to EU demands. 
 
Fifth, conceptually it is difficult to define the object of withdrawal negotiations. To 
understand this conceptual difficulty, it is instructive to consider for a moment the 
purpose of the accession negotiations.  In reality accession negotiations have a well-
established aim: to determine that the candidate country accepts and is capable of 
complying with all the obligations of membership. These obligations are well 
understood and precise. They are laid down in primary and secondary legislation. 
Notwithstanding their political importance, the true negotiations play only a minor 
part in the whole process because they come at the very end of a lengthy process, 
they last only a few weeks and they largely concern just two issues: money and 
votes. Whereas accession negotiations have a clear final destination, withdrawal 
negotiations do not. As Article 50 TEU provides, the negotiations “take account of 
the framework for [the withdrawing county’s] future relationship with the Union”. 
But no one can know in advance what such relationship may be. It can range from 
MFN status to a simple free trade agreement, to membership of the European 
Economic Area or to a new higher form of privileged partnership with the EU. 
Moreover, as will be explained in detail in the next section, withdrawal can pose 
particularly difficult problems to the withdrawing country itself. This is because when 
EU law ceases to apply to it, there will be a legal lacunae. It is not obvious how it 
can be filled. In some cases, the withdrawing country may very well decide to keep 
EU rules it has already transposed in its domestic law. In some other cases, it will 
necessarily take time for the withdrawing country to replace EU law. In the 
interregnum there can be instances of legal ambiguity or conflict. Such issues are 
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bound to affect the process, content and time length of exit negotiations, as the 
withdrawing country tries to secure a smooth transition from the status of full 
Member State to its preferred alternative. 
 
Sixth, exit will likely leave behind legacy issues. When a country accedes to the EU, 
it is obliged to adjust all its agreements with third countries so that there is no 
conflict between its bilateral obligations with those countries and its EU obligations. 
For example, an acceding country may not offer more privileged treatment to the 
products or companies of third countries than what it offers to EU products and 
companies. Equality is the expected standard of treatment. But when a country 
leaves the EU, such equality will no longer be required. Presumably the treatment 
that EU products, companies and nationals receive in the withdrawing country will 
be a matter of negotiation and will mirror the treatment that its products, companies 
and nationals will receive in the EU. The rights of established national and 
companies may be grandfathered while no such rights are extended to new arrivals. 
 
Seventh, when an acceding country adjusts its international agreements with third 
countries the purpose of the adjustment is ex ante clear. It is alignment with the 
acquis. When a country leaves the EU and it will not be bound by EU law, first of all, 
it is not clear whether it also withdraws from international agreements negotiated on 
its behalf by the EU. Perhaps, mixed agreements [i.e. those signed by both the EU 
and Member States] will continue to apply. But those, in which only the EU is a 
signatory party, will probably have to be re-negotiated. In this case, the withdrawing 
country may want to maintain the status quo or grab the opportunity to escape from 
the obligations created by such agreements. At any rate, third countries will also 
have to give their consent and, in case of disagreement, the withdrawing country 
may not be able to count on the support of the EU. 
 
Eight, the role of the Commission in the accession process is pivotal while in the exit 
process appears to be marginal. The accession process is largely managed by the 
Commission: from its initial avis, to the monitoring of the progress of the candidate 
country, to the conduct of the negotiations, to the preparation of the negotiating 
briefs for the EU, to its final avis. By contrast, Article 50 TEU makes no mention of 
the Commission. It only refers to the procedure in Article 218(3) TFEU which states 
that the Commission “shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall 
adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the 
subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of 
the Union's negotiating team.” The Commission is limited to submitting 
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recommendations, rather than being consulted as in Article 49, and it may not even 
negotiate on behalf of the EU as it normally does for other kind of negotiations. With 
the Commission’s role foreseen to be more circumscribed, the question is who will 
safeguard the interests of the Union as a whole and who will prepare the common 
positions of the Member States. 
 
Ninth, Article 50 provides that the withdrawing Member State does not participate in 
the decisions of the European Council or Council that concern it, but is silent on the 
role of the MEPs from the withdrawing country. Given that they are elected directly 
by the people, presumably they will represent the interests of the people and, in 
principle, may even express views opposing those of their own government. A 
similar question mark hangs over the role of the officials in EU institutions who are 
nationals of the withdrawing country. In theory, they act independently. However, 
will they be excluded from any negotiations to prevent potential conflict of interest? 
 
These differences indicate that exit negotiations will be fraught with difficulty. There 
will be many issues of disagreement and dispute and many possibilities for conflict. 
Even ignoring political problems, the exit negotiations present a challenge of a much 
larger magnitude simply because of the largely undefined nature of the post-exit 
relationship between the EU and the withdrawing Member State. The purpose of the 
next section is precisely to consider in greater detail the issues that are likely to 
confront a withdrawing Member State at it proceeds to the post-exit status. 
 
 
6. Is exit easier than entry? 
 
In addition to the differences identified above, it appears that, for a number of 
reasons explained below, exit is procedurally and easier than entry for the country in 
question. This is in stark contrast to the substantive difficulty of exit, whose various 
aspects are analysed in the following section. 
 
First, the role of the Commission is minimal. Whereas under Article 49 TEU, the 
Commission provides opinions (“avis”) on the suitability of the candidate country and 
on the impact of its accession on the functioning of the Union itself, in Article 50 
TEU, the Council decides without having to consult the Commission. Article 50 TEU 
envisages that the Commission only provides recommendations with respect to the 
“opening of negotiations” according to the procedure in Article 218(3) TFEU. During 
past accession negotiations, initial and final “avis” of the Commission and the 
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periodic progress reports very much set the tone of the negotiations, the framework 
within which Member States acted and specific requirements that had to be satisfied 
by the candidate country. In the absence of such guidance and agenda setting, 
withdrawal negotiations should be procedurally easier, but not necessarily more 
effective or better managed. 
 
Second, whereas the Commission has always negotiated with candidate countries on 
behalf of the EU, Article 50 TEU refers to Article 218(3) TEFU which provides that 
the Council nominates the “Union negotiator”. So, it possible that the negotiator may 
not be the Commission. This raises a question mark as to who will protect the 
interests of the Union as a whole. It may be easier for Member States in the Council 
to stitch an agreement with the withdrawing country. 
 
Third, while the accession procedure of Article 49 TEU is not limited in time, 
withdrawal negotiations must be concluded within two years. 
 
Fourth, whereas entry of a new Member State is decided on the basis of unanimity, 
exit of an existing Member State will be decided by the Council according to qualified 
majority. 
 
Fifth, whereas entry of a new Member State requires the consent of the Parliament, 
acting by a majority of its component members, exit only needs to receive the 
consent of Parliament. Article 50 TEU does not explicit stipulate majority of 
component members, so consent would require only majority of the votes cast. 
 
Lastly, with the exception of the withdrawing Member State itself, there is no 
reference to ratification of the result of the exit negotiations. 
 
It appears from the brief comparison of entry and exit procedures that exit is in 
theory easier than entry. There are fewer and lower hurdles to overcome and 
Member States do not seem to be as rigorously constrained by the guidance of the 
Commission. Perhaps the reason for this apparent ease is that a Member State that 
is determined to leave the EU cannot ultimately be prevented from doing so.  
 
When considering the requirements and procedure of entry into the EU in relation to 
those of exit from the EU, a paradox arises. Whereas the purpose of entry is clear, 
the procedure is long and arduous. By contrast, exit appears to be easy even though 
Ph. Nicolaides, Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A review of Economic and Legal Complexities 
 
13 
 
its final destination is undefined and uncertain. The next section explains why the 
nature and consequences of exit are nebulous. 
 
 
7. The challenges for the withdrawing Member State 
 
For whatever reason a Member States decides to leave the EU, it will face a number 
of challenges. These challenges are largely caused by the fact that, as explained in 
the previous section, exit from the EU is tantamount to embarking on a trip in an 
uncharted territory. 
 
The first such challenge will be to identify the nature and extent of the links that it 
would want to maintain with the EU after its exit. Article 50 TEU, by referring to a 
“future relationship”, alludes to the possibility that withdrawal does not have to be 
full and absolute. The withdrawing country may neither seek nor is obliged to sever 
all ties with the EU. But there is no blueprint for alternatives to full membership. At 
present, there are varying categories and levels of relationships between the EU and 
third countries. The closest and most involved links are those established by the 
European Economic Area. However, nothing prevents a withdrawing country from 
seeking a higher or lower relationship or even a mixture of different types of 
relationships [e.g. EEA minus Schengen plus military cooperation]. 
 
A second challenge is the replacement of EU law in the withdrawing country. For 
some issues, it will not have to do anything. For example, it will not have to provide 
statistics to Eurostat, it will not have to submit the programmes which are required 
in the framework of macroeconomic coordination or it will not have to send annual 
reports to the Commission on the amount of state aid it grants. Moreover, in the 
case of EU rules which are applied through enabling national law, as for example in 
the case of transposed directives, the withdrawing country may decide to leave 
everything in place. But for regulations which are directly applicable, explicit 
decisions will have to be made. This issue of legal lacuna is examined in more detail 
in the next section. 
 
A third major challenge will be the assessment of the economic impact of exit. Since 
every study on the effects of accession to the EU has shown that membership is 
overall beneficial both to the new member and the rest of the EU, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that exit may have a net negative impact. This of course will 
very much depend on the nature of the post-exit relationship. But at any rate the 
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withdrawing Member State will need to know the economic repercussions of exit so 
that it can implement remedial policies. For example, a non-insignificant economic 
difference between entry and exit from the EU is the presence or better the absence 
of EU institutions in the local economy. While before entry the effects of having an 
EU agency are not taken into account, when a Member State leaves the EU the 
effects of a concomitant departure of EU agencies cannot be ignored. For example, 
if the UK leaves the EU it may lose the European Medicines Agency, the European 
Banking Authority and the European Police College. The presence of EU agencies in 
Member States means a source of employment, a source of income, a place of 
research and continuous upgrading of labour skills. 
 
The fourth challenge will be the management of the budgetary impact of exit from 
the EU. Naturally, if a country leaves the EU it will not have to contribute to the 
budget of the Union. This, however, should not be a forgone conclusion as it will 
also depend on the nature of the post-exit relationship with the EU. For example, 
Norway is not a member of the EU, yet it contributes to the funding of structural 
programmes in the new Member States through the “EEA facility”. Ignoring such 
post-exit arrangements, the obvious impact of withdrawal will be zero payments to 
the EU and, at the same time, zero receipts from the EU. If the withdrawing country 
is a net contributor, this outcome may be deemed to be beneficial. If on the 
contrary, it is a net recipient, the outcome may be detrimental. Moreover, the 
withdrawing country will then have to decide whether to maintain the benefits that 
its farmers receive from the common agricultural policy, the funding that its poor 
regions obtain from structural funds and the research subsidies that its companies 
get from the EU’s framework research programmes. Even an opponent of the CAP 
such as the UK, will face the dilemma of what to do with its farming sector. Cutting 
support abruptly will not be an attractive political option. 
 
A fifth challenge for the withdrawing country will be to develop its own policy with 
respect to third countries in policy fields such as trade where the EU enjoys exclusive 
competence. Certainly, it will have to decide whether to assume all of the obligations 
that emanate from agreements between the EU and third countries and secure them 
through the negotiation of bilateral agreements with those third countries. Given 
that the EU has probably the largest network of trade agreements in the world, the 
task for the withdrawing country will be daunting. But in other fields too there will 
be need for either re-negotiation or establishment of completely new agreements 
[e.g. air transport rights negotiated by the EU]. Ironically, withdrawal from the EU 
will certainly require adjustment of bilateral links with non-EU countries. 
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A sixth challenge will be the establishment of new rules and forms of cooperation 
with the EU where there are genuine public goods shared by EU Member States or 
where there are significant cross-border externalities. The point here is not whether 
a withdrawing country would want to maintain close economic and political links with 
the EU. Rather, it is about the management of resources that will necessarily have to 
be done even after exit from the EU and the tackling of problems that cannot be 
avoided even after withdrawing from the EU. The examples that immediately spring 
to mind are fisheries, atmospheric pollution and ceilings on CO2 emissions, cross-
border interconnection of trans-European transport, energy and communication 
networks, battling of money laundering, arms trafficking and other forms of cross-
border illegal activities. 
 
A seventh challenge will confront especially a withdrawing Member State that is in 
the Eurozone and has the euro as its legal tender. In all probability it will have to 
replace the euro with its own currency. It may revert back to the currency it had 
before adopting the euro or it may introduce a totally new currency. Whatever it 
does it will not be easy. Indeed, with no doubt whatsoever the most daunting 
challenge will be the timing of the introduction of its new currency. The markets will 
not wait two or more years until the withdrawal negotiations are concluded. The 
assets of a Member State with AAA rating such as Finland will immediately 
appreciate. At the other extreme, a Member State with C rating such as Greece will 
see an immediate depreciation of its assets and capital flight. Then capital controls 
will have to be introduced as in Cyprus in March 2013. Exit of a Member State from 
the Eurozone is an unplannable event. No matter how such exit is managed, the 
withdrawing Member State will also have to buttress its monetary institutions. 
Although all Eurozone members have national central banks, they do not carry out 
monetary policy as this is currently the exclusive competence of the European 
Central Bank. The central bank of the withdrawing Member State will have to be 
empowered to make decisions in monetary policy. In addition, its institutional 
capacity may have to be strengthened with the establishment of independent 
monetary policy bodies such as the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of 
England.  
 
In summary, Article 50 implies that withdrawal means that EU law simply ceases to 
apply. But as it is shown in this section withdrawal will create many other headaches 
and will necessitate many other tasks. The purpose of the next section is to consider 
in more detail one of those tasks: the replacement of EU law and EU-mandated 
institutions and procedures. 
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8. Non-application of EU law or emergence of a legal lacuna? 
 
Article 50 TEU provides that the Treaties “shall cease to apply to the State in 
question”. Since the main purpose of the Treaties is to create rights and obligations 
for Member States, it is reasonable to surmise that if they cease to apply, the 
withdrawing Member State will lose the rights it has of access to and equal 
treatment by other Member States and will be relieved of the obligation to offer 
unhindered access to and treat without discrimination other Member States, their 
products, companies and nationals. The purpose of this section is to consider the 
broad consequences of the termination of the application of EU law in the 
withdrawing Member State. 
 
It is rather obvious that once the treaties cease to apply to it, the withdrawing 
Member State will not have to abide by the principles of free movement, free 
establishment, non-discrimination, etc. These are the instruments used by the 
Treaties to build an integrated market. The withdrawing Member State will then be 
free to exclude products, nationals and companies from other Member States, 
provided it has not been negotiated otherwise in a post-exit arrangement and 
provided the treatment it accords to EU products and nationals is compatible with 
WTO rules. It is, however, highly unlikely that it would be to its benefit to erect 
barriers around its economy. 
 
Although foreign nationals and companies will lose their automatic right of entry, the 
question that arises is what happens when EU rules become non-applicable to 
domestic situations as well. In the case of directives which are transposed into 
domestic law, the applicability of that law may continue even after withdrawal from 
the EU. There is nothing in Article 50 TEU to prevent a withdrawing Member State 
from keeping EU law that it has already transposed into its domestic legal order. 
However, EU law is also applicable through regulations that have a direct effect and 
do not require prior transposition. In this case, a legal lacuna may be created. This 
will be most acute in those fields that the EU enjoys exclusive competence. The 
withdrawing Member State will have to consider whether and how to fill the gap. 
The following two examples illustrate the problem. 
 
In the field of state aid, Article 108(3) TFEU and Regulation 659/99 require public 
authorities to notify all new state aid to the Commission for approval. No Member 
State has any national authority responsible for authorising aid precisely because the 
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Commission has exclusive power to assess the compatibility of aid with the internal 
market. If a Member State leaves the EU, it will not have to comply with EU state aid 
rules, but it will have to decide whether to allow its public authorities to compete 
against each other via state aid. If it would decide to impose a conditional 
prohibition such as that of Article 107(1) TFEU, then it would have to designate an 
authority to take over the role of the Commission and would still have to decide 
whether to adopt rules on compatibility which are similar to those of Commission 
guidelines. 
 
In the field of trade, Regulation 1225/2009 lays down the EU anti-dumping rules. No 
Member State maintains its own anti-dumping rules. The withdrawing Member State 
will have to decide whether to adopt its own rules, possibly copying those of the EU. 
In that eventuality, it will also have to assign to a domestic authority the 
investigative tasks currently carried out by the Commission. 
 
Admittedly, given the exclusive competence of the EU in the field of trade and 
competition, it is rather natural that withdrawal from the EU will create a legal 
vacuum. But such legal fissures will appear in all policies which are implemented 
through regulations. 
 
In addition to these problems that will arise immediately upon exit from the EU, 
there will be other problems linked to the interpretation and evolution of EU law. 
Even where Member States have their own laws, such as competition, or rules such 
as the precautionary principle in risk prevention, they follow the interpretation of the 
Court of Justice to prevent conflicts between EU and domestic law. Suppose a 
Member State leaves the EU and the next day the Court of Justice delivers a new 
judgment that departs substantially from previous case law. How should the courts 
in the former Member State respond to the new interpretation? Ignore it or adopt it? 
It would be sensible to adopt it unless there are overwhelming considerations to the 
contrary. 
 
In conclusion, a Member State contemplates withdrawal from the EU when it is 
dissatisfied with the balance of rights of obligations of membership. Yet, in a rather 
paradoxical way, the likelihood of exit will be determined to a large extent by the 
strength of the relationship that the withdrawing Member State will be able to 
maintain with the EU after it leaves the EU. As the case study in the next section 
demonstrates, complete severance of all ties is the least desirable option. 
 
Ph. Nicolaides, Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A review of Economic and Legal Complexities 
 
18 
 
 
9. Economic impact and credible economic policy management: Why 
independence is not necessarily advantageous 
 
The likely economic impact of withdrawal from the EU will certainly have a decisive 
influence on the conduct and outcome of withdrawal negotiations. As the case 
studies below reveal, a withdrawing Member State is likely to want to keep the 
benefits from EU membership [e.g. access to the internal market] and discard costly 
or cumbersome obligations [e.g. contributions to the budget, auditing by EU 
institutions / reporting to EU institutions]. It is impossible to know at this stage how 
successful a withdrawing Member State can be at such “cherry picking”. That will 
depend on multiple factors such as its negotiating power [e.g. size], the concessions 
it is willing to make and the nature of the post-exit relationship it would want to 
maintain with the EU. 
 
The economic impact of withdrawal itself is likely to be determined to a large extent 
by market expectations concerning both the formal contents of a withdrawal 
agreement and the post-exit economic policies that will be pursued by the 
withdrawing country. In some respects this impact will be the opposite of that of 
entry into the EU. Just as markets reacted positively in many cases of prospective 
entry into the EU, in the case of withdrawal they may react negatively even before 
withdrawal is completed. 
 
For example, even before the new Member States formally acceded to the EU, their 
economies boomed on the crest of a large influx of foreign direct investment. That 
investment was fuelled by optimism that the economic policies of the then 
prospective Member States would become both more liberal and more predictable as 
a result of EU membership. Foreign investors felt more confident because they could 
petition EU institutions such as the Commission if their interests were harmed or 
could invoke directly applicable EU law to protect those interests.5 
 
Independent policy making may in some circumstances be a boon but the possibility 
that it can turn out to be a bane cannot be lightly dismissed. What markets want 
above all is credible policy making: actually delivering what is promised. Credibility in 
policy making and policy management may be thought of as a function that is 
directly related to the degree of accountability of a public authority [i.e. the more 
                                               
5 Jacques Pelkmans and Jean-Pierre Casey, EU Enlargement: External Economic Implications, April 
2003, College of Europe, BEEP briefing no. 4. 
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accountable a public authority is, the more credible its policy] but only partly related 
directly to the degree of independence of that authority. This is because, on the one 
hand, an authority with little independence may be excessively constrained and not 
being able to deliver what it promises while, on the other, an authority with too 
much independence may act at will without being subject to any effective 
sanctions.6 Too much independence can be a bad for credibility as too little 
independence. 
 
A withdrawing country may gain formal policy-making independence but may lose 
policy credibility because EU institutions will have much less influence over its 
policies and because it will be constrained to a much smaller degree by EU rules. It 
may also prove difficult for a country, that will find itself in a legislative flurry and 
will be busy establishing new institutions, to put in place at the same time effective 
accountability mechanisms and identify the right degree of institutional 
independence for its policy making authorities. Even if in principle new policy-making 
institutions and procedures are properly designed, they will need time to prove their 
worth. In the meantime, markets may react with excessive pessimism. 
 
Assume that we can measure institutional accountability and independence and their 
relationship with policy credibility. We may reasonably surmise that accountability 
has a direct, one-to-one relationship with credibility; that is, the more accountable 
an organisation, the more credible it is. However, the relationship between 
independence and credibility is not so straight forward. At low levels of 
independence an organisation is not very credible because it is influenced by other 
extraneous factors. Similarly, at high levels of independence, an organisation may 
not be more credible because it can act at will. However, for middle levels of 
independence an organisation may be more credible because its actions become 
more predictable – less influence by others and less acting on whim. 
 
Figure 1 depicts these relationships and indicates why policy credibility can be 
difficult to achieve. The right balance of accountability and independence is an 
empirical issue of trial and error. If the withdrawing country happens to be on the 
left of “X” [which is the degree of independence that generates the maximum level 
of credibility], then some degree of additional  independence can prove to be 
                                               
6 For more detailed analysis of these issues see Phedon Nicolaides, Microfoundations of Policy 
Implementation: Towards European Best Practices, (London: Routledge, 2013) and Phedon 
Nicolaides, Economic Integration and the Structure of National Institutions, Intereconomics, 2012. 
Ph. Nicolaides, Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A review of Economic and Legal Complexities 
 
20 
 
beneficial to it. If, however, it happens to be to the right of “X”, then any additional 
independence may result in less credible policy making. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Policy Credibility  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of policy credibility, institutional independence and at the same time 
binding constraints have been amply stressed in the recent report of the Scottish 
Government on a future macroeconomic framework for Scotland in case of 
independence from the UK.7 Below are some indicative quotations from the report 
on the need for policy credibility, independence and binding rules. 
 
“3.18 To deliver on these objectives, the work of the Fiscal Commission Working 
Group has been focussed around four key themes: 
1. Credibility – the framework should deliver confidence for businesses, investors, 
financial markets and the people of Scotland. The design of a robust and 
transparent framework is essential to enable policy makers to take advantage of 
the discretion and autonomy that independence would bring. 
2. Sustainability – the framework should be affordable and support sustainable 
development – in the widest possible sense – over the medium to long-term. 
3. Stability – the framework should provide coherent and predictable 
macroeconomic policies. It should also retain sufficient flexibility to respond to 
short-term pressures and unforeseen events. 
                                               
7 Scottish Government, Fiscal Commission Working Group - First Report - Macroeconomic Framework, 
(Edinburgh, February 2013). It can be accessed at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00414291.pdf 
Policy 
Credibility 
Accountability 
Independence 
Accountability 
Independence 
X 
Ph. Nicolaides, Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A review of Economic and Legal Complexities 
 
21 
 
4. Autonomy – the framework should seek to provide the maximum degree of policy 
autonomy. It should also be sufficiently dynamic to evolve over time to meet 
changing economic conditions or preferences.” [p. 26] 
 
“5.85 For rules to be credible, it is recognised that they must also offer some 
flexibility in the event of unpredictable events. It is advantageous to have clearly 
defined ‘escape clauses’ which set out the circumstances under which this flexibility 
will operate. This avoids charges of manipulation of the rules.” [p. 90] 
 
“5.87 Experience has shown that rules are generally most effective when there are 
effective discipline devices in place and when there are transparent mechanisms to 
monitor compliance. The lack of independent oversight is one of the reasons why 
the previous UK 
Government’s fiscal rules were seen to lack credibility.” [p. 90] 
 
“5.95 By providing independent oversight they can improve the credibility of the 
macroeconomic framework and give confidence to markets.” [92] 
 
The debates in Scotland on future independence and in Brussels and Frankfurt on 
future monetary, financial and fiscal rules, have highlighted the importance of 
credible policy making and independent and accountable institutions. A Member 
State that withdraws from the EU will have an uphill struggle to persuade markets 
that it will use its newly acquired independence credibly. The eventual economic 
impact of exit from the EU will very much depend on how convincing will be its pre-
exit commitments and post-exit achievements. 
 
 
10. Case study I: Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU 
 
On 23 January 2013, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, spoke about his 
intention to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership. He said that he would 
then put the results to a referendum. If British people reject the new arrangements, 
the UK will have to leave the EU. The UK, therefore, has become the first Member 
State to officially consider the prospect of withdrawal from the EU. The purpose of 
this section is to examine how the present UK government envisages that such 
withdrawal may take place. 
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But first, it is instructive to take note of how the UK has approached the issue 
concerning its membership. It does not regard it as a “take-it-or-leave-it” decision. It 
is trying to adjust the terms of its engagement with the EU before it gives formal 
notice of withdrawal. Such a possibility is neither provided, nor prohibited by Article 
50. After his speech, Mr Cameron was reported to have contacted several EU leaders 
to garner support for his idea of renegotiating the terms of membership through 
broader treaty reform. It is reasonable to surmise that the reason for preferring 
treaty reform to outright exit is because adjusted membership is a superior option to 
non-membership, not only for the benefits of unobstructed access to the EU’s 
internal market, but also for the fact that members have a seat at the decision-
making table so that they can influence the future evolution of the EU and the shape 
of its policies – something that outsiders cannot do.8 
 
Indeed the speech acknowledges that exit is a painful option: loss of access to the 
internal market, no say on EU rules and loss of international standing. As Mr 
Cameron observed, “if we leave the EU, we cannot of course leave Europe. It will 
remain for many years our biggest market, and forever our geographical 
neighbourhood. We are tied by a complex web of legal commitments. Hundreds of 
thousands of British people now take for granted their right to work, live or retire in 
any other EU country. Even if we pulled out completely, decisions made in the EU 
would continue to have a profound effect on our country. But we would have lost all 
our remaining vetoes and our voice in those decisions. … Continued access to the 
Single Market is vital for British businesses and British jobs. … We would have to 
think carefully too about the impact on our influence at the top table of international 
affairs. There is no doubt that we are more powerful in Washington, in Beijing, in 
Delhi because we are a powerful player in the European Union. That matters for 
British jobs and British security. It matters to our ability to get things done in the 
world.” 
 
If exit is a harmful option, much has been written in the press about the supposedly 
“true” intentions of Mr Cameron. Undoubtedly, like every leader who makes a major 
European speech, he had two audiences in mind: the European and domestic. It is 
outside the purpose of this paper to examine the role of the speech in domestic 
                                               
8 It is telling that some of the most credible critics of the UK’s membership justify their views on the 
supposedly small benefits from free trade within the internal market and the supposedly large costs 
from external trade barriers and the common agricultural policy. See Brian Hindley, Martin Howe, 
Better Off Out? The benefits or costs of EU membership, Revised edition, (London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2001). 
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British politics. Domestic politics are ignored here. Also ignored is the possible 
negotiating strategy of the UK. The speech was only the opening move in a long 
process. Like in all negotiating situations, it sets out maximalist objectives some of 
which will not be achieved. The purpose of this section is to take at face value those 
points of Mr Cameron’s plan which relate to withdrawal and analyse what they reveal 
about the options of a Member State wishing to leave the Union. 
 
Mr Cameron justifies the possibility of seeking withdrawal on the grounds that EU is 
becoming irrelevant to British people and that the EU is losing democratic legitimacy. 
He claims that there are three challenges facing Europe: 
“First, the problems in the Eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe. 
Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the 
world soar ahead. Third, there is a gap between the EU and its citizens which has 
grown dramatically in recent years. And which represents a lack of democratic 
accountability and consent. If we don’t address these [three] challenges, … the 
British people will drift towards the exit.” 
 
These few sentences suggest that any Member State that would want to leave the 
Union would claim that membership undermines its prosperity and that what is 
decided in Brussels is either not subject to sufficient democratic control or far 
removed from the concerns of its citizens. Irrespective of whether such claims are 
true or not, the only relevant issue would be the claimed irrelevance of the EU.   
 
In his speech, Mr Cameron also outlines the process of obtaining popular mandate, 
negotiating with the EU and putting the result to plebiscite. That process has four 
stages as follows. First, at the next general elections in 2015, the government will 
seek to obtain popular mandate to initiate negotiations with the EU. Second, if 
elected, it will pass special legislation for that purpose. Third, negotiations with the 
EU will take place. And fourth, the results will be put to referendum. “And when we 
have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum 
with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on these new terms; or come 
out altogether. It will be an in-out referendum.” 
 
Interestingly, Mr Cameron does not refer to ratification by parliament. Perhaps this is 
regarded as self-evident in the UK’s legal system. While Article 49 explicitly refers to 
ratification, Article 50 does not. But since withdrawal of a Member State means 
change in the treaties, ratification will be necessary, according to Article 48 TEU, for 
other Member States too. 
Ph. Nicolaides, Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A review of Economic and Legal Complexities 
 
24 
 
If the “new settlement” is rejected by the referendum, the UK does not envisage 
rejoining the EU at a later point. “If we left the European Union, it would be a one-
way ticket, not a return.” So, the last sentence of Article 50, which refers to rejoining 
the EU, may be useful to some but certainly not every Member State that decides to 
withdraw. 
 
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the speech demonstrates in quite stark terms 
the ranking of options facing a Member State that may contemplate withdrawal from 
the EU. The preferred option is to remain in a suitably adjusted EU (call this option 
1). The second-best option is to negotiate favourable terms for a preferential post-
membership relationship with the EU (option 2). Exit with no access to the EU, or 
rather only MFN access, is the worst option (option 3). After outlining his vision for 
the future of the EU and how to achieve it, Mr Cameron defines his ranking of 
choices for Britain as follows: “I believe the best way to do this will be in a new 
Treaty … My strong preference is to enact these changes for the entire EU, not just 
for Britain. But if there is no appetite for a new Treaty for us all then of course 
Britain should be ready to address the changes we need in a negotiation with our 
European partners.” 
 
These preferences can be summarised as follows: 
Adjusted membership (option 1) > exit with privileged access (option 2) > status 
quo > exit with no access (option 3). 
 
In view of this ranking, it is worth considering before concluding this paper what a 
withdrawing Member State may hope to obtain from exiting the EU. What does the 
behaviour of the UK so far indicate? In other words is the option of exit which is now 
formally allowed by Article 50 a useful option?  
 
Since it is not possible to gauge the UK’s true intentions, we have to go by what is 
stated in Mr Cameron’s speech. In a nutshell, he wants the internal market and he 
would be happy with intergovernmental cooperation on other issues. He also 
understands the usefulness of being able to shape EU rules, so he does not wish the 
UK to become like Norway or Switzerland with access to the internal market but 
without a seat at the table. So the EEA is not a post-exit option, at least for now, for 
the UK. 
 
Mr Cameron explicitly rejects restrictive labour markets, excessive regulation, 
interference in justice and home affairs. He wants to protect the pre-eminence of 
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the City as a financial centre, more favourable environment for SMEs, a reformed 
fisheries policy and smaller EU institutions. These are not in themselves 
unreasonable demands and reform to the liking of the UK is not beyond the realm of 
possibility. 
 
Although it is rather unlikely that he will succeed in getting other Member States to 
agree to more intergovernmentalism, he may achieve general changes in some 
policies and he may obtain some specific exceptions for Britain. Perhaps the idea of 
the referendum is to pacify Eurosceptics in the UK and at the same time put 
pressure on other Member States to make concessions on policy reform. Perhaps all 
the talking of withdrawal is a ruse. 
 
If the Member States are not willing to agree to option 1 (because it means 
weakening common rules rather than strengthening them as many Member States 
currently want), then the realistic choices for the UK are narrowed down to three: 
option 2, the status quo and option 3. Since option 3 is the least preferred outcome, 
it follows that exit negotiations are likely to focus on how much of its current 
privileges the UK will be allowed to retain and how much of its current obligations 
the UK will be able to discard. It a nutshell, it seems that withdrawal, if it ever 
occurs, will not be so much about outright exit but about finding a new type of 
association with the EU. 
 
If this ranking of options is generalised in a game-theoretic framework it leads to 
some interesting results. Assume that a Member State that considers withdrawing 
from the EU calculates its possible pay-offs as follows: 
Conciliatory bargaining: 
1: if the EU also bargains softly and is willing to accommodate it [the EU here loses -
1 because it has to deviate from its common principles]; 
0: if the EU does not give in [the EU here does not gain or lose anything]. 
Hard bargaining: 
2: if the EU makes concessions [the EU then loses -1]; 
-3: if the EU is intransigent and the Member State in the end leaves without any 
post-exit agreement [the EU also loses -2 from the exit of that Member State]. 
 
A pay-off matric can then be constructed that reflects these expected gains and 
losses. 
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Withdrawing 
Member 
State 
EU 
 Conciliatory Intransigent 
Conciliatory 1, -1 0, 0 
Intransigent 2, -1 -3, -2 
 
It can be seen that if the EU adopts a conciliatory stance, the dominant option for 
the withdrawing Member State is to bargain hard [it gains 2]. By contrast, if the EU 
bargains hard, then the withdrawing Member State prefers to be conciliatory [gains 
nothing]. The same reasoning applies to the EU. The outcomes are given by the 
shaded rectangles. We see that the dominant strategy of each side depends on the 
first move of the other side. But in this case, the withdrawing Member State can 
force the first move of the EU by making a pre-commitment. If it announces that it 
will bargain hard, for example, it will be in the interest of the EU to be conciliatory 
and accommodate its requests. 
 
In fact this is what the UK may have sought to achieve by announcing that the 
results of the negotiations with the EU on a new relationship would be put to a 
popular referendum. Given the rather anti-EU mood in the UK, the UK government 
must extract from the EU significant concessions if it is to win the referendum. It has 
signalled to the EU that its back is against the referendum wall and no concessions 
should be expected from its side. The ball now is in the EU’s court. 
 
 
11. Case study II: Opting out of justice and home affairs 
 
Recently the UK has signalled both its wish to re-negotiate the terms of its 
membership and its intention to opt out from legislation on justice and criminal 
matters. Article 10 of Protocol 36 grants to the UK the right, five years after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, to notify to the Council that it does not accept 
to be bound by a number of measures in the field of police cooperation and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Article 10(4) of Protocol 36 then provides that the 
relevant acts “shall cease to apply” to the UK. The language used in Article 50 TEU 
and Protocol 36 is strikingly similar. The UK submits a notification to the Council and 
certain parts of EU law cease to apply to it. It is therefore worth examining how the 
UK itself has defined the expected impact of the ceasing of the application of EU 
law. 
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The issue of contention concerns about 130 acts of cooperation on police and 
criminal matters. If the UK opts out it will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice or the enforcement powers of the European Commission. On 23 
April 2013, the House of Lords EU Committee published a report entitled EU police 
and criminal justice measures: The UK’s 2014 opt-out decision. It states that “the 
decision on the opt-out is one of great significance, with far-reaching implications 
not only for the UK but also for the other Member States and the EU as a whole. 
Cross-border cooperation on policing and criminal justice matters is an essential 
element in tackling security threats such as terrorism and organised crime in the 
twenty-first century.”9 
 
Not surprisingly, those in favour of the opt out based their arguments on the need 
for the UK to protect its autonomy both in terms of future policy development and in 
terms of judicial independence. Those in favour of staying in stressed, on the one 
hand, the benefits of cooperation with other EU countries in terms of enhanced 
security and the “benefits of legal clarity and the stronger and more consistent 
application of EU measures across the EU” from being subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice.10 On the other, they warned of the harm that would be suffered 
in case of opting out from the loss of influence over EU decisions on police and 
criminal matters. 
 
Regardless of the validity and relative significance of these different points of view, 
for the purposes of this paper three issues are of more direct relevance. First, the 
Committee concluded “that the concerns of proponents of opting out, in particular as 
regards the role of the CJEU, were not supported by the evidence we received and 
did not provide a convincing reason for exercising the opt-out. We have failed to 
identify any significant, objective, justification for avoiding the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU over the pre-Lisbon PCJ measures in the UK and note that the Government 
appeared to share that view in respect of the number of post-Lisbon PCJ measures 
to which they have opted in. Indeed, we believe that the CJEU has an important role 
to play, alongside Member States’ domestic courts, in safeguarding the rights of 
citizens and upholding the rule of law.”11 
 
The last two quotations lend support to the view that uniform interpretation and 
application of EU law is beneficial to Member States. However, indirectly they also 
                                               
9 UK House of Lords, EU Committee, EU police and criminal justice measures: The UK’s 2014 opt-out 
decision, p.7. 
10 Op. cit. p. 7. 
11 Op. cit. p. 8. 
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indicate that the Committee believed that irrespective of whether the UK would 
choose to remain in or leave this area of EU law, it could not stop the Court of 
Justice from interpreting EU law and that its interpretations would affect the UK as 
well regardless of whether it was in or out. In the event that the UK would opt out, 
UK courts would still have to consider the case law of the Court of Justice and avoid 
conflicting interpretations concerning similar situations. This underlines the fact that 
withdrawal from the EU does not necessarily mean that that the legal system of the 
withdrawing country will be able to ignore the evolution of EU case law. 
 
Indeed the second issue in the work of the House of Lords EU Committee that is of 
direct relevance to this paper is that its report also considers the various options that 
would be open to the UK in case of an opt out. Some of them require the 
introduction of autonomous UK rules. This also underlines the fact that non-
application of EU law will in reality require re-legislation. 
 
Lastly, when the Committee considered the various alternative scenarios that would 
be available to the UK such as annulment of EU-based measures, it in fact concluded 
that many of those that were incorporated in UK law did not have to be annulled 
because they corresponded to principles and safeguarded rights that were very 
much embedded in the UK legal system. Once more we see that non-application of 
EU law does not mean that EU law already transposed or incorporated in national 
law must necessarily be deleted. Withdrawal of a country from the EU does not have 
to remove law that originated in Brussels. 
 
 
12. Case study III: Procedural issues: The referendum on possible 
withdrawal of Scotland from the United Kingdom 
 
In an ironic twist of fate, at the same time that the UK is contemplating withdrawal 
from the EU, the Scottish government is advocating withdrawal from the UK. Even 
more ironic and more revealing are the arguments used by the British Prime Minister 
to persuade Scots that they would fare better if they remained in the union with 
England. But, first, to his credit, Mr Cameron has accepted to be bound by the will of 
the Scottish people as it will be expressed in a referendum scheduled for the Autumn 
of 2014. 
 
In a statement that was published on the website of the Prime Minister’s office on 10 
February 2013, Mr Cameron argued that Scotland was better off by having two 
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governments: A Scottish that dealt with local issues and a UK that dealt with cross-
border and international issues. This division of competences, which in the case of 
the EU is embedded in Article 5(3) TEU on subsidiarity, is of course the functioning 
principle of the EU itself. 
 
Mr Cameron also wrote that “Scotland within the UK has a system of government 
that offers the best of both worlds. Why swap Scottish MPs, Scottish Cabinet 
Ministers and Scots throughout UK institutions, for one Scottish Ambassador in 
London?” He pointed out the obvious benefits of Scotland being involved in common 
decision-making in Westminster. Withdrawal means loss of influence. 
 
Given the complexity and multi-level interdependence between regions and 
countries, it is very unlikely that a country or a large-enough region like Scotland can 
be better off by positioning itself at any of the two extremes of either no degree of 
self-governance or complete independence.1213 This reinforces a point made in the 
previous section that whether a country eventually withdraws will depend on the 
kind of post-exit arrangements it can negotiate: how much of its obligations it can 
discard without losing too much of its rights. 
 
Mr Cameron concludes the statement by tackling a procedural issue. He declares 
that “as one of Scotland’s two governments, the UK Government has a duty to help 
inform people with hard facts. So we’ll be providing expert-based analysis to explain 
Scotland’s place within the UK and how it might change with separation”. This 
reveals a structural  weakness in Article 50. No one is either explicitly responsible or 
given the right to put the case in favour of remaining an EU Member State to the 
citizens of the withdrawing country. Although the EU would try to preserve its 
                                               
12 The prospect and possible effects of Scottish independence have already been analysed in several 
publications and reports. These publications have a substantial speculative element because no one 
knows the extent of future independence or the terms of the post-independence relationship with the 
rest of the UK. What is, however, interesting but not surprising is that both the public debate and the 
academic analysis have focused on issues that very much mirror those that are bound to be the 
subject of any negotiations on withdrawal from the EU. As an example, here is a list of topics 
examined in the House of Lords Report on the Economic Implications for the UK of Scottish 
Independence that was published on 10 April 2013: Single market, trade, inward investment, 
regulation & taxation, division of assets and liabilities, North Sea oil & gas, currency options and 
consequences, financial regulation, fiscal policy, international economic implications, the European 
Union, international tax treaties. In addition, the House of Lords Report examined defence issues and 
the fate of military installations in Scotland. See also the analysis in Andrew Goudie (ed), Scotland’s 
Future: The Economics of Constitutional Change, (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2013). 
13 In this connection, it should also be added that other Member States of the EU also face similar 
situations as for example Spain and Catalonia. See Jordi Matas et al, The Internal Enlargement of the 
European Union: Analysis of the Legal and Political Consequences for the European Union in the Case 
of a Member State’s Secession or Dissolution, (Barcelona: Centre Maurits Coppieters, 2011). 
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integrity, the withdrawing country could regard any EU attempt to inform its 
domestic debate as unwarranted interference. This is another indicator of the 
acrimonious climate that may surround a withdrawal. 
 
 
13. Conclusions 
 
Although withdrawal from the EU is now formally possible, the process by which it 
can happen is unclear and potentially complex. A withdrawing Member State will not 
only rid itself from the constraints and obligations of EU law, but it will also have to 
re-legislate to fill the gap left by EU law. 
 
While the objective of entry into the EU is known and fairly well-defined, the 
objective of withdrawal is not. It depends on the post-exit relationship that the 
withdrawing Member States negotiates with the EU. In this respect, the outcome will 
be shaped by the wishes of the two sides and their relative bargaining power.  
 
The case of the UK and Scotland suggests that outright exit is not the best option for 
a withdrawing Member State. The best, but possibly the least feasible, option is an 
intermediate arrangement falling between full membership and complete separation 
from the EU. The exact position between the two extremes can only be determined 
by the exit negotiations and will be influenced by the political climate that will prevail 
at that time. 
 
The case of the UK and Scotland also reveals that the public debates that are bound 
to take place on both sides of the negotiating divide will not be balanced. Unlike the 
debate in Scotland in which the UK government feels free and perhaps obliged to 
make contributions, the withdrawing Member State is unlikely to welcome counter-
arguments put by EU officials or politicians from other Member States. The debate 
will be vigorous but will not be impartial. Once the lid of the withdrawal box is 
opened, it will be difficult to close it and harness the exit forces that it will unleash. 
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